Without doubt the noun gene is one of the most important words in life sciences. From its very introduction it has held a certain ambiguity and uncertainty. Both scientists and philosophers have attempted to reveal the nature of a gene. However, despite the abundance of attempts to clarify the definition, we might not actually need to unite the various suggested definitions into one. As Evelyn Fox Keller has pointed out (2000: 139-41), the ambiguity of this noun makes communication between scientists from diverse disciplines far easier, because it enables them to refer to slightly different entities using a single term. Since it is much more difficult for scientists from different disciplines and with different perspectives to use exactly the same definition, such ambiguity is critical for fruitful communication. In addition, this noun has greatly contributed to forming a synthesized view of life. Indeed, it is critical for perceiving biology as a whole. However, Keller warns us that it also gives us a certain incorrect perspective on the nature of life phenomena by making us view genes as entities that ontologically precede cellular systems -in other words, as independent and separable elements contained within the cell. Keller's concern seems plausible, because genes never exist independently of their environment. At the same time, however, there are certain situations in which we should consider these environment-dependent entities as independent, or, more accurately, in a state of "epistemic independency." To sup. port Keller's point, in this essay I argue that genes are neither ontologically nor epistemically independent. First, I briefly point out two reasons for the apparent independency of genes. Second, I refute their ontological independency. Then, I argue that genes are not even epistemically independent. Finally, I briefly draw some lessons from the arguments.
